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No one doubts that numeric information can be used to provide good reasons for 
beliefs and judgments, and no one doubts that the same type of information can be used 
to mislead, intimidate, and illegitimately persuade.  The study of how numeric 
information does and does not rationally persuade is a major research task that is already 
being undertaken by psychologists and statisticians (Kahneman, Gigerenzer).  
Interestingly what this research shows is that many of the ways that numeric information 
is presented fail to be adequately understood and appreciated by the audience.  The 
rhetorical concern raised by this research is to find ways to communicate numeric 
information that can be readily understood and used by non-mathematicians.  The more 
common concern of logicians with rhetoric has been the concern that persuasive 
techniques will lead people to accept beliefs without providing adequate reasons for these 
beliefs.  Given the ubiquitous use of statistical information, in everything from informed 
medical consent to public policy decision-making, both problems can have significant 
consequences. As a teacher I am particularly concerned with finding ways to help 
students make sense of and evaluate statistical information. Such information presented 
in a credible and intelligible fashion can be of great value.  One of the most central uses 
of statistical methods is inferential statistics.  Inferential statistics provide the basis for 
polling and statistically based scientific research such as sociology, psychology, and 
epidemiology.  While acknowledging the importance and value of such statistical 
methods, in this paper I argue that the presentation of research and polls based on 
statistical methodology is often misleading.  I am not arguing that such research be 
ignored or dismissed, but rather that the claims emerging from such research be viewed 
as conclusions of informal (i.e. not statistical) arguments. 
 My basic assumption is that for a contemporary educated audience, numbers can 
speak louder than words. This means that the proper presentation of numeric information 
can often be more effective than arguments presented without numbers.  It also means, 
that in those cases where the numeric information does not deserve a great deal of 
argumentative weight, appropriate caution and qualification needs to be exercised in its 
presentation.  There are many such cases.  In particular I will argue that the typical 
presentation of inferential statistics is flawed and misleading.  The air of precision created 
by the use of concepts such as “margin of error” and “confidence level” is seldom 
warranted despite the respect that they invite.   
 The analogy I would like to draw is with the Ad Hominem fallacy.  In the real 
world of argumentation it is almost always useful to know about the biases and 
motivation of the author of an argument.  The problem is that many use the knowledge of 
an author’s motivation or point of view to dismiss or ignore the actual arguments 
presented by the author.  The problem could be characterized by pointing out that Ad 
Hominem remarks frequently have a persuasive (or dismissive) value significantly in 
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excess of their probative value or logical worth.  I will argue that something similar 
happens with the presentation of numeric information, particularly inferences from 
samples.  The language and conceptual framework of statistical inferences such as 
sampling, margin of error, statistical significance, confidence levels, and the like are 
frequently used without the logical (mathematical) pre-conditions for their use.  
Nonetheless, the conclusions are typically stated with a mathematical precision that 
usually carries a persuasive force in excess of their epistemological worth.  Conclusions 
of most statistical inferences used in polling and research should be viewed with far less 
confidence than the numbers claim and suggest: the precision used in expressing 
confidence intervals and statistical significance is seriously misleading. 
 In the alternative I suggest that the proper way to view statistical inference is not 
as a mathematical inference but as part of an informal inductive argument.  I will sketch 
the form of this argument and provide some illustrative examples.   
 While much of my paper is critical of the presentation of statistical information, I 
wish to make it clear that I am not critical of the use of statistics and experimental 
methodology as a means for coming to a well grounded understanding of our world   My 
concern is with the undue rhetorical force that the presentation of such information 
typically carries. 
 Before proceeding I need to make a brief and simplified description of the logical 
basis of statistical inference.  Sampling and the inferences made from samples are 
generally based on the assumption that the samples are random, meaning that every item 
or person in the population being sampled has an equal chance of being selected for the 
sample.  If the sampling process does not guarantee equal chance of selection for all 
members of the population, then the process is biased and there is no mathematical basis 
for making the kind of inferences that are typically stated.   Given a random sample and 
certain assumptions about the distribution of the population, probabilistic inferences can 
be made about the likelihood that a sample statistic is close to that of the actual value in 
the population.  The results of such statistical inferences are expressed in terms of how 
likely (the so-called confidence level) the sample statistic is within a margin of error (±) 
of the population value.  
 Note that the prerequisite for this probabilistic reasoning is that the sample should 
be a random sample of the target population, not, as is often stated, that the sample 
should be “representative” of the population.  The latter concept has a kind of intuitive 
attraction until you realize that it is impossible to say what a representative sample is 
unless it is a random sample.  The concept of representativeness is based on the 
assumption that we can identify those properties a person in the sample possesses that 
count towards representativeness (e.g. gender, income, geographic location, eating 
habits).  The claim of representativeness also assumes that we know the rate of people in 
the population who have these properties and can therefore check if the sample is 
representative, i.e. we can check if our sample has the approximately the same proportion 
of men and women, rich and poor etc. as in the population.  Key problems with 
“representativeness” are that we don’t know which properties are the relevant ones to use 
to determine “representativeness” and, in many cases, we don’t know the actual 
proportions in the population.  Not that we can’t make reasonable claims about these 
issues, but however credible the claim for representativeness, a representative sample is 
not the random sample required as the basis for the statistical inference.  A case can be 
made for the “representativeness” of a sample, and such cases are often made by pollsters 
and less frequently by researchers, but this case needs to form part of the argument for 
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any generalization based on the sample.   
 Unfortunately, pollsters and researchers typically treat the inference from a 
sample to the generalization about the population as a kind of mathematical deduction as 
follows: 
 
1. Results of our sample of size X (typically around 1000 in national polls) is S 
(the so called statistic, e.g. “70% of the sample expressed support for Kyoto”). 
 
Therefore, (according to statistical theory) there is a 95% chance (we can be 95% 
confidant) that the population parameter, P, is S ± 3.1 percentage points.   (P 
being the value that in theory would be obtained if all members of the population 
were surveyed.)   
 
But this won’t do.   Samples are never truly random and this is well understood by 
pollsters.  The qualifications regarding the sampling process should be part of the 
argument.  Responsible pollsters often acknowledge (frequently in  a footnote) the 
inappropriateness of such mathematical precision.  For example, the Harris pollsters in 
the US append the following footnote to their polls:  
 
In theory, with a probability sample of this size, one can say with 95 percent 
certainty that the results have a statistical precision of plus or minus 3 percentage 
points of what they would be if the entire adult population had been polled with 
complete accuracy. Unfortunately, there are several other possible sources of error 
in all polls or surveys that are probably more serious than theoretical calculations 
of sampling error. They include refusals to be interviewed (non-response), 
question wording and question order, interviewer bias, weighting by demographic 
control data and screening (e.g., for likely voters). It is impossible to quantify the 
errors that may result from these”   
(http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=309). 
 
Note “ impossible to quantify”.  True, but an informal, not quantified argument 
can be made that the sampling process produces a survey that is likely biased in certain 
way(s).  For example, studies have been done that try to determine the biases introduced 
by non-responders (now there is a challenge!), and certainly studies can be made of 
people who don’t have phone  (Moore).  There is also considerable information about the 
effects of question wording and question order, and of course some effort is made by 
pollsters to guard against easily dealt with sources of bias such as question order.  
Pollsters also make other adjustments that supposedly account for the non-randomness of 
their sample.  But, as Harris admits (above), this is not statistics.  To varying extents, 
pollsters take these issues and biases into account, but when they report their results they 
seldom include any arguments or even explain their efforts to adjust for “polling bias.”   
 There is one well known situation in which pollsters make efforts to adjust their 
results in view of the difficulty they have in sampling their target population.  National 
elections provide a kind of “gold test” of polling techniques.  Pollsters make considerable 
effort to identify and poll only voters, and to adjust for other sources of bias in their 
polling.  Despite these efforts, the results of presidential election polling published by 
Gallop (see appendix) suggest a much higher margin of error or much lower level of 
confidence than pollsters typically claim.  About a third of Gallop’s predictions were 
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outside the +/- 3% margin of error he claimed.  These errors occur despite the fact that 
these polls are often of much larger samples and “adjusted” for representativeness by 
pollsters (Wheeler 142-143). 
 Since it is impossible to quantify the biases identified by Harris, the argument for 
the conclusion should make limited and cautious use of numeric information.  The 
argument might look like the following: 
 
1. Results of sample of size X (typically around 1000)  is S (the so called 
statistic, e.g. 70% of the sample expressed support for Kyoto) 
2. The polling techniques were as follows:……….. 
3. The reason to believe that this sample is close to what a genuine random 
sample of this size would have been (i.e. the reason to believe that this sample 
is more or less representative of the target population) is … 
 
Therefore, there is a reasonable chance that the population parameter P is pretty 
close (though not better than ± 3.1 percentage points) the sample percentage S. 
 
If such candour and transparency were common, pollsters might simply 
acknowledge that the target population of their polling is not all citizens or adults, but 
rather the group of people who have phones, answer their phones, speak the pollsters’ 
language and are willing to answer their questions.  It is unlikely that this target 
population is “representative” of the more general population, so there is a clear bias built 
into such a sample.  Pollsters could acknowledge this problem, but argue that since the 
same polling techniques are used from survey to survey, polls do a good job of tracking 
over time the attitudes of this particular sub-population of the general populace.  Such an 
argument is perhaps a bit cynical, but at least it is not deceptive. 
 While the confidence and or precision that pollsters claim for the 
conclusions/generalizations of their “arguments” are generally overstated, their 
generalizations are undoubtedly more trustworthy than either anecdotal evidence or those 
polls generated by self-selected samples (e.g. write in, phone in, or now “click in” 
surveys).  In most of these cases there is not even a prima facie case for the claim that a 
sample of self-selected respondents is a random or “representative,” sample and 
absolutely no basis for even alluding to the standard statistical methods and inference.   
I don’t wish to overstate this standard dismissal of self-selected samples.  Given the 
difficulties in getting random and unbiased samples using standard polling techniques, 
the sharp line usually drawn between polling techniques that preclude self-selection and 
those that allow for it is perhaps exaggerated.  Take a personnel “climate survey” of a 
small company done by a mail out and request for response.  Suppose that 120 of 180 
employees respond.  Their response is of course self-selected and almost sure to be 
biased in ways that are difficult to determine.  Will the discontented respond 
disproportionately or will those who are happy respond in greater numbers?  Hard to say 
and the use of the statistical concepts of margin of error and confidence level would 
clearly be inappropriate.  But if efforts are made to ascertain whether the respondents are 
“representative”  in terms, for example, of distribution throughout the company divisions, 
then non-statistical arguments could be made that the proportions in those replying were 
likely representative of the staff as a whole. 
 While pollsters present their “arguments” and generalizations with misleading 
precision they are still relatively clear about their target population.  Such is seldom the 
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case with academic research. 
 
The Problem Of The Uncertain Target Population 
 
As most readers know, there are basically three ways to study humans: case 
studies, cohort studies, and experimental studies.  In case studies, researchers isolate 
individuals to be studied initially on the basis of their having a symptom such as blood 
clots or lung cancer or violent behaviour. They then compare this group to another group 
(usually in the same hospital or institution but without the same symptoms).  The 
comparison group is matched on the basis of a variety of factors depending on the nature 
of the study such as age, lifestyle, and economic background.   The researchers then 
compare the two groups looking for differences in past behavior or conditions of the two 
groups that correlate with the current illness or behavior.  For example, we might look for 
evidence that the lung cancer group smoked at a higher rate than a group without lung 
cancer, or, that the women with blood clots showed a higher frequency of birth control 
pill use, or, that violent criminals watched more violent television.   
 Results from such studies are fraught with uncertainty.  Obviously, they do not 
involve random samples of any population.  In fact the target population of these studies 
is often obscure.  This is not to say that such studies have no value.  The case study 
approach is often of great value, especially when trying to study a condition that is 
relatively rare, or recently emerging, such as blood clots in young women.  But many 
researchers using the case study method also use mathematical techniques to justify the 
claim that there is or is not a statistically significant difference between e.g. the rate of 
blood clots among women who take birth control pills and those who don’t.  Certainly a 
prima facie case could be made for a correlation using this method, but the use of 
statistical inference which is based on the assumption of random sampling is misleading.   
 The best the researchers can tell us is that had the groups been randomly selected 
from a population, such differences that exist between the groups would have been 
statistically significant.  Basically what researchers are looking for is a large enough 
difference between the two groups to provide evidence that a suspected cause such as the 
birth control pill should be further investigated.  Used with this kind of candour and 
transparency, the arguments would have the appropriate non-formalness consistent with 
the nature of the case study method. 
 An interesting historical example of the kind of difficulties involved, and the use 
of statistics being misleading (in this case misleading to the researchers), was an early 
study on smoking (Stolley, 1995). In the early fifties, two studies of approximately 600-
700 cases of lung cancer were done that compared the rate of smoking among lung 
cancer victims and a comparison population.  How was the research done?  By 
comparing the smoking history of hospital patients.  While both studies found a slightly 
higher rate of smoking among the cancer victims than the comparison group of hospital 
patients, the differences were not great enough to be statistically significant, i.e. the 
difference in the rate of smoking between the group with lung cancer and the control 
group was not greater than that allowed for by the margin of error.  In other words, the 
researchers could not be confidant the difference in rates was not due to chance.    
 While researchers still suspected there was a relationship between smoking and 
lung cancer, their study failed to demonstrate it.  Why?  With the advantage of hindsight 
we can see the problem.  While none of the patients in the “control group” had lung 
cancer, many of them had illnesses to which we now know smoking contributes (e.g. 
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heart disease).  As a result the control group was not “representative” of the non-lung 
cancer population—the control group was biased towards smokers.  Its members smoked 
more than the healthy population obscuring the actually dramatic difference between the 
rates of smoking among people with and without lung cancer.  These studies graphically 
illustrate the potential problems in using samples of convenience rather than truly random 
samples. 
 Texts on research methods usually acknowledge that case study results are only 
preliminary and suggestive, and this is usually noted in the studies themselves.  Because 
such studies can legitimately provide a basis for applying for funding to support more 
reliable studies, there is a temptation to allow “misrepresentation” of the value of the 
results to enhance publicity facilitating the acquisition of more research funding.   
 Because of the limited possibility of studying humans in a randomized 
experimental controlled study, the most common approach to studying humans is the 
cohort study approach.  The term “cohort study” is applied to different kinds of 
prospective studies. In one approach a group with the putative cause (e.g. smoking) and a 
“comparable” control group without the cause are followed over time and the incidence 
of an effect (e.g. lung cancer) is studied. The group without the putative cause is, of 
course, supposed to be like that with the cause except for the difference in exposure to the 
suspected cause.  The difficulties in setting up such comparison groups are obvious.  
Without random assignment to control and experimental groups, the use of the usual 
statistical machinery is not really justified.   
 Another form of cohort study involves tracking a large group of people over a 
period of time as in the Harvard Health or Framingham studies.  In this kind of study, the 
researchers follow a very large group of people keeping a record of what they hope are all 
the relevant details of their lives and then studying the data for correlations. Such studies 
avoid the problem of setting up comparison groups and because of the large samples 
involved and long time frame, appear to give credible results.  
 But such “data mining” is itself fraught with methodological problems.  First we 
must assume, which is seldom argued for, (and often completely implausible) that these 
large groups are representative of “the” population in general.   In what sense, for 
example, are Harvard graduates, likely be a “representative” sample of any population?  
Then there is the awkward fact that even if the studies were done on genuine random 
samples, at the 95% confidence level, it is likely that 1 out of every 20 apparent 
correlations is due to chance rather than an actual correlation.   
 While many statisticians warn against the problem of data mining, there is seldom 
mention of the far more egregious problem that the samples are not random samples of a 
target population.  There is also the well recognized problem of the confounding factor.  
When the correlation between, for example, exercise and life expectancy is detected, the 
scientific challenge is to separate out from a constellation of lifestyle choices, the 
influence of one factor such as exercise -- healthy people tend to eat healthily and 
exercise.  A variety of mathematical techniques have been developed to isolate individual 
associations.  I do not pretend to understand the mathematics involved (and neither, I 
suspect do most researchers as the work is done by computers), but the lack of random 
sampling of the target population still means that these results cannot be statistically 
generalized.  Which is the target population? Humans? North Americans? Americans? 
Harvard Graduates? Men? 
 It might be thought that most of the problems addressed above can be solved if it 
is possible to run a proper randomized experiment.   Such studies involve the random 
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assignment of subjects into control and experimental groups with the experimental group 
receiving exposure to treatment or putative cause.  As one commentator puts it:  
 
Experimental studies are less susceptible to confounding because the investigator 
determines who is exposed and who is unexposed. In particular, if exposure is 
allocated randomly and the number of groups or individuals randomized is large 
then even unrecognised confounding effects become statistically unlikely 
(Coggon, Ch. 9). 
 
Obviously the commentator is thinking of the confounding effects of “self-
selection” among subjects in a cohort study, but while randomization addresses this issue 
it does not address the more crucial issue of generalizability to a target population.  This 
generalizability needs arguing for, and even if there is a “statistically significant 
difference” between the two groups studied, one cannot conclude that such a difference 
would also be true of the target population  
 Many researchers appear to believe that they have met the need for randomization 
when they randomly assign subjects to experimental and control groups as is typically 
done, for example, in the case testing for drug efficacy.   But this is randomization of the 
group (often volunteers) that has agreed to be studied.  This is not the same as starting 
with a random sample of a population, for example the population of the people with a 
certain illness.  If the population the researchers were interested in studying was simply 
the group of people being actually studied in the experiment, then the margin of errors 
and confidence levels would be a justifiable indication of whether differences (between 
the two specific groups being studied) were likely due to chance or the result of the 
experimental factor such as the drug treatment.  But of course, no one is only interested in 
the people being studied. Those being studied are supposed to be a sample of the greater 
target population. Without those selected for study being randomly selected there is no 
statistical basis for inferring from “statistically significant” results in the experiment to 
the same likelihood that these results are true of the (target) population.   What the 
researchers owe the reader is not mathematics but a case, a non-mathematical case, that 
the groups studied are non-biased in important ways.  A case that is often hard to make. 
As one writer on epidemiology puts it: 
 
Bias cannot usually be totally eliminated from epidemiological studies. The aim, 
therefore, must be to keep it to a minimum, to identify those biases that cannot be 
avoided, to assess their potential impact, and to take this into account when 
interpreting results. The motto of the epidemiologist could well be "dirty hands 
but a clean mind" (manus sordidae, mens pura)  (Coggon Ch. 4). 
 
 Perhaps this is why texts on research often emphasize that experiments with 
statistically significant results still require replication.  If the samples were genuinely 
random and of reasonable size and the results significant enough (not merely statistically 
significant), then the case for replication could only be based on the possibility of error or 
bias in areas such as measurement etc..  Without collecting random samples, the best 
method we have for controlling (by no means eliminating) biased sampling is through 
replication.  This is one reason why carefully done meta-analysis is probably the most 
reliable method of evaluating claims.  By melding together data from credible studies 
(credible, but still plagued by lack of true randomization) researchers doing meta-analysis 
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can make a case that the resultant data and inferences are less likely to be a product of 
biased sampling than any individual study.  Less biased, but hardly free of bias.  Much 
research is based on “samples” of convenience, which often means using people in 
peculiar institutions such as hospitals and universities – groups that are likely to be 
different than the general population in a variety of ways.  Collecting such studies still 
raises the problem of selection bias.  Making numerous studies of college youth all across 
North America, for example, which is a common modality of research and replication in 
psychology, should not give one confidence that these studies can claim to have plumbed 
the human mind. 
 A particularly controversial example of the problem statistical of inference from 
an experimental study being generalized to target population was in a study of gender and 
racial bias among doctors.  The study is described in detail below.  There were two 
rhetorical issues.  The numeric information was presented in a manner that overstated the 
putative racial and gender biases of the doctors studied, and the doctors studied were 
assumed by the media to be a “representative” sample of doctor population.  By 
interpreting the numbers as they did, the media were acting as if the doctors being studied 
were a random sample of the population of US doctors.  While the researchers comments 
acknowledged the difficulty of generalizing from their data, the announced confidence 
levels and odds ratios “said” otherwise and the numbers (albeit misunderstood) spoke 
louder than the words.  A kind of reverse of “poisoning the well”--  the qualifying 
remarks failed to temper the “message” contained in the numbers. 1
 In Feb 1999, a study published in, as they always say, the “highly respected” New 
England Journal of Medicine, alleged that race and sex of a patient influence how 
physicians manage symptoms of heart disease.  While the study focused only on heart 
disease diagnosis and recommended treatment, papers such as the New York Times ran 
headlines such as “Doctors’ bias may affect health care.”  The following is a brief 
summary of the study’s methodology: 
 
In a randomized controlled study, Schulman et al. determined how often doctors 
recommended cardiac catheterization for hypothetical patients with chest pain. At 
two professional meetings, 720 primary care physicians were shown a videotaped 
interview with a patient (portrayed by an actor) and given other relevant data 
(cardiac risk factors and the result of a thallium stress test) and were then asked 
whether they would recommend catheterization. The investigators developed 18 
hypothetical scenarios representing all possible combinations of the following 
factors: 3 descriptions of chest pain, 2 levels of cardiac risk, and 3 results of 
thallium stress tests. In order to isolate the influence of race, sex, and age on the 
physicians' decisions, each scenario was portrayed by eight actors (representing 
two races, both sexes, and two ages). The investigators then determined how often 
these "patients" with identical symptoms and medical histories were referred for 
cardiac catheterization. 
 
The results, as presented by the authors in their abstract were: 
 
Logistic-regression analysis indicated that women (odds ratio, 0.60; 95 percent 
confidence interval, 0.4 to 0.9; P=0.02) and blacks (odds ratio, 0.60; 95 percent 
confidence interval, 0.4 to 0.9; P=0.02) were less likely to be referred for cardiac 
catheterization than men and whites, respectively. Analysis of race–sex 
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interactions showed that black women were significantly less likely to be referred 
for catheterization than white men (odds ratio, 0.4; 95 percent confidence interval, 
0.2 to 0.7; P=0.004). 
 
Conclusions 
Our findings suggest that the race and sex of a patient independently influence 
how physicians manage chest pain (Schulman et al). 
 
The following table from their study summarizes the data: 
 
 
Ironically, the conclusion of the article in contrast to the abstract, is stated cautiously and 
moderately. 
 
Our finding that the race and sex of the patient influence the recommendations of 
physicians independently of other factors may suggest bias on the part of the 
physicians. (my emphasis) 
 
And they admit that their sample while clearly not random might also not be 
representative: 
 
The recruitment of physicians at national meetings of major professional 
organizations may have resulted in non-representative samples. Physicians who 
attend professional meetings may be better informed than those who do not 
attend. Also, the physicians who volunteered for this project may have had a 
greater interest than others in coronary heart disease. 
 
An admission, but not perhaps a very thoughtful one.  It is easy enough to think of 
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other ways in which this group might not be representative for example race, gender, and 
economic circumstance (going to conferences cost time and money). 
 Despite the qualifications in their article, the numbers they report in their tables 
(and the statements in the abstract – another rhetorical issue) spoke more powerfully.  
What the table seems to say is that if you are a black, and/or female you will likely be 
referred for catheterization at 60% the rate of white males (and if you are a black female, 
at 40% that rate) despite having the same presenting symptoms. 
 While fully untangling the message of the numbers is a bit complex because of 
the use (in this case, misleading use) of “odds ratio,” even a cursory look at the table 
suggests that the differential reference to catheterization is primarily associated with 
being a “black female.”    
 Commentators pointed out (Schwartz), and the authors in a subsequent response 
acknowledged (Schulman 1999b), that the use of  “odds ratio” was rhetorically ill 
advised.  Odds ratios are similar to risk ratios but only if the incidence of what is being 
studied is relatively small.  In this case with most “patients” being referred for 
catheterization, the “risk” of being referred was extremely high and the odds ratio 
extremely misleading because it will almost always be read as a risk ratio.  Every news 
reporter that wrote up the study treated the “odds ratio” as a “risk” ratio.  In fairness to 
the reporters, Schulman admitted that the study’s use of odds ratio was “potentially 
misleading.” 2    
 In a critical article, (Schwarz), a different table summarizing the data is presented. 
Looking closely at this table makes it even clearer that it is only black women who are 
referred at a significantly different rate than white men, and that even they are referred at 
only a slightly lower percentage. 
 
So there were at least three rhetorical difficulties with this report.  1.  The choice 
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of “odds ratio” artificially inflated the appearance of difference in recommendations. 2. 
The aggregation of women on one hand and blacks on the other was completely 
misleading since all the differences were actually resulting from the difference in 
recommendations for black women.  3. There was no reason given for believing that this 
particular health issue and referral practice was “representative” of treatment approaches 
and differences in other domains.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Numbers often speak louder than words.  The rhetoric of numbers requires a 
careful presentation of statistical information so that the audience will give numeric 
information its appropriate argumentative worth.  The presentation of statistical 
inferences should be treated as informal argumentation with explicit acknowledgement of 
the issues surrounding population and sample selection that limit the applicability and 
appropriateness of statistical inference.  There are of course reasonable inferences to be 
made from careful research and polls.  These inferences are not simply the result of 
applying of statistical formulae.  They require consideration and acknowledgement of the 
extent to which samples deviate from the mathematical assumption of random selection 
of a clearly defined population.  The arguments that justify inference from a sample to a 
population should explicitly refer to the variety of non-mathematical considerations 
involved.  Researchers and pollsters should explicitly address the greater uncertainty 
involved in inferences from non-random sampling methods.  They should also provide a 
clear indication of what population is being studied and sampled.  Carefully done polls 
and statistically based research are often the best means we have for making reasonable 
claims about the views of populations and causes of social and medical ills.  They are 
useful tools for evaluating causal interventions and can provide a useful check on causal 
impressions.  They are tools of judgment and informal argument, and should not be 
allowed to create illusory confidence.    
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Gallup Poll Accuracy Record 
Year Candidates Final Gallup Survey Election Result Gallup Deviation 
1996 Clinton 52.0 50.1 +1.9 
  Dole 41.0 41.4 -0.4 
  Perot 7.0 8.5 -1.5 
1992 Clinton 49.0 43.3 +5.7 
  Bush 37.0 37.7 -0.7 
  Perot 14.0 19.0 -5.0 
1988 Bush 56.0 53.0 +2.1 
  Dukakis 44.0 46.1 -2.1 
1984 Reagan 59.0 59.2 -0.2 
  Mondale 41.0 40.8 +0.2 
1980 Reagan 47.0 50.8 -3.8 
  Carter 44.0 41.0 +3.0 
  Anderson 8.0 6.6 +1.4 
  Other 1.0 1.6 -0.6 
1976 Carter 48.0 50.1 -2.1 
  Ford 49.0 48.1 +0.9 
  McCarthy 2.0 0.9 +1.1 
  Other 1.0 0.9 +0.1 
1972 Nixon 62.0 61.8 +0.2 
  McGovern 38.0 38.2 -0.2 
1968 Nixon 43.0 43.5 -0.5 
  Humphrey 42.0 42.9 -0.9 
  Wallace 15.0 13.6 +1.4 
1964 Johnson 64.0 61.3 +2.7 
  Goldwater 36.0 38.7 -2.7 
1960 Kennedy 51.0 50.1 +0.9 
  Nixon 49.0 49.9 -0.9 
1956 Eisenhower 59.5 57.8 +1.7 
  Stevenson 40.5 42.2 -1.7 
1952 Eisenhower 51.0 55.4 -4.4 
  Stevenson 49.0 44.6 +4.4 
1948 Truman 44.5 49.5 -5.0 
  Dewey 49.5 45.1 +4.4 
  Wallace 4.0 2.4 +1.6 
  Other 2.0 3.0 -1.0 
1944 Roosevelt 51.5 53.8 -2.3 
  Dewey 48.5 46.2 +2.3 
1940 Roosevelt 52.0 55.0 -3.0 
  Wilkie 48.0 45.0 +3.0 
1936 Roosevelt 55.7 62.5 -6.8 
  Landon 44.3 37.5 +6.8  
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Notes 
 
1 There was an excellent critique published in the NEJM, (Schwartz et al, 1999) and a 
more popular critique in the Atlantic Monthly (Satel, 2001) . 
 
2 Schulam offers the following odd defence of his report: “Our study hypotheses, as stated 
in the original grant application, were that blacks would be less likely to be referred for 
cardiac catheterization than whites and that women would be less likely to be referred 
than men. Our reporting of the sizes of the main effects of race and sex is therefore 
consistent with fundamental statistical principles (Schulman et al, 1999b). 
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